New Challenge: Organize Mexican Drivers!
the end of the year, Mexican trucking companies (perhaps some U.S.-owned) expect
to be sending their big-rigs and Mexican drivers across the U.S.-Mexican border,
under bipartisan NAFTA legislation. Up to now, the Teamsters leadership has led
the union’s longhaul drivers to expect that their wages and working
conditions, and perhaps their jobs, are at stake because of low-wage Mexican
union’s counter strategy has two prongs. The first is to woo both Democrat and
Republican politicians to block cross-border trucking. An unacknowledged
Teamsters deal with the Clinton administration maintained the pre-NAFTA status
quo. But it was understood that no matter which party won last year’s
presidential election, the NAFTA agreement would be implemented.
second prong of the Teamsters strategy is to argue that Mexican trucks are
hazardous, and consequently American motorists nationwide will be at greater
risk as they drive the nation’s congested roads and highways. It’s true that
Mexico’s truck fleets are older, its highways rougher on tires and brakes. But
stateside highway safety checkpoints miss many U.S. trucks that should be tagged
and repaired. So undoubtedly some unsafe Mexican big-rigs will be on the
highways, and inevitably accidents and fatalities will result.
the safety argument hasn’t gained much traction, perhaps because of the union’s
mediocre record when it comes to fighting trucking bosses on safety issues. For
decades the Teamsters had the contractual right to strike over deadlocked
grievances, but the leadership avoided using that hard-won right to back up the
ranks’ safety grievances.
Teamsters union has failed to fight trucking bosses who push drivers to violate
hours-in-service regulations, purportedly designed to keep sleepy, exhausted
drivers off the road. Numerous studies indicate that the majority of truckers
work more hours than the law specifies. Indeed, one union-friendly academic
analyst calls today’s big-rigs “sweatshops-on-wheels.”
no wonder. The Teamsters union has thousands of members working under contracts
that are clearly piecework schemes. Rather than get paid by the hour, these
drivers are paid by the mile and the load. The more loads they deliver, the more
they are paid. And the faster they drive, the more loads they deliver.
failure of the Teamsters two-prong strategy was predictable, partly because it
was based on getting favors from politicians wedded to the bosses’
profiteering interests. If the union’s leadership had mobilized the
independent strength of its members, as was done during the 1997 UPS strike, if
it had sought a strategic alliance based on workers solidarity with Mexican
truckers, the union would be in a much stronger position to resist the bosses’
use of Mexican labor to increase their profits at the expense of both American
and Mexican drivers.
least one top Teamster official has talked about the possibility of organizing
Mexican drivers. Teamsters Vice President Chuck Mack has said, “If we have
cross-border trade, and possibly cross-border trucking, why not cross-border
organizing?” At a March meeting in
California of financiers, politicians, and labor officials with Vicente Fox, the
recently elected Mexican president, Mack raised the issue of cross-border
organizing with Fox. Mack says that Fox “did not summarily dismiss the idea.
He thought and then said he was open to discussing it and suggested that I
follow up with Mexican representatives.”
However, Fox’s real attitude about workers’ problems may be indicated not by his talking to Mack, but by the fact that Fox employs child labor on his agricultural holdings, according to numerous reports. So it’s likely that Fox was just shining Mack on. Nevertheless, Mack seemingly talks as if Fox can be relied on to do the right thing for the union, just as Mack relies on American politicians—who have failed to even maintain the buying power of the minimum wage.
the Great Depression, the Teamsters union faced the challenge of organizing the
mostly unorganized over-the-road drivers. Clearly the problems of organizing
during a time of mass joblessness, cutthroat business competition, antiunion
laws, and vicious, organized antiunion opposition were complex and tough. To
successfully meet the challenge the union had to break out of the cities where
it was pent up, and move into the up-to-then impregnable havens for nonunion
everyone knows, the Teamsters won, hands down. A key union strategist,
organizer, and fighter, the secretary-treasurer of Minneapolis Teamsters Local
544, Farrell Dobbs, said, “For the Teamsters International, it was an
unprecedented triumph.” The membership jumped to nearly 500,000 by 1939 from
only 80,000 six years before. At the heart of the union’s winning campaign
was, as Dobbs wrote, “a class-struggle outlook…the industrial form of
organization…We defended and sought to advance trade union democracy. We
bargained on an area-wide basis to establish uniform wages and conditions for
all workers involved.”
The strategic principles of the 1930s Teamsters militant organization of the over-the-road truckers might well be applied to the problems of organizing today’s Mexican drivers, as they appear on the nation’s roadways. First, rely on a mobilized Teamsters membership, not on the false promises of politicians whose first loyalty is to their own power and wealth. Second, make being a union member really mean something, by winning contracts that Teamsters can be proud of, not merely get by on. In other words, give workers on this side of the border tangible reasons once again to be excited about unions, their members, their causes and issues. Third, extend a hand of solidarity to all Mexican workers, with no ifs, ands or buts. And of course, be prepared to take on the organized forces of antiunionism, who, as experience shows, will line up politicians, judges, cops, and private goons to protect their profitable turf.
Dobbs were around today, he’d likely say, “With the opening of the
U.S.-Mexican border, don’t mope and mourn! Organize, Teamsters, organize!”