In the Wake of Bush’s Conquest of Iraq
An Assessment of U.S. Threats against the
Cuban Revolution
Quiet May 20 in D.C. Marks Gain for Cuba
in Clash
by Fred Feldman
This is an edited version of an article
posted by the author on May 21, 2003. It serves also as an introduction to the
article by Jim Lobe, of the Inter Press Service, which we post below for the
information of our readers.
What does the date May 20 stand for? A
few words on that are in order.
May 20, 1902, was the day the U.S. “granted
independence” to Cuba, after taking it from Spain in the Spanish-American War
of 1898. A rebellion by Cubans against Spain had begun in 1895 and was on the
verge of succeeding when the U.S. intervened. Thus, May 20, 1902, was a
caricature of “independence,” which Washington and its hangers-on may celebrate
but true Cuban patriots do not. It was marred by the results of the
Spanish-American War. For four years after that war, from 1898 to 1902, Cuba
remained under occupation by U.S. forces (perhaps an example of what is in
store for Iraq).
As the price of U.S. withdrawal of forces
in 1902 Cuba had the Platt Amendment imposed on it, granting the Guantanomo
naval base to the U.S., along with the right to intervene in Cuban affairs in
the future. After U.S. forces withdrew in 1902, they returned four times—in
1904, 1912, 1917, and 1920. U.S. occupation was succeeded by a string of puppet
governments in Cuba whose main job was to protect the interests of U.S.
corporations, banks, and investors. The real independence that Cuba’s heroes,
José Martí, Antonio Maceo, and others, fought for was won only on New Year’s
Day in 1959 when the July 26 Movement led by Fidel Castro, Che Guevara, and
others marched into Havana as the culmination of their guerrilla war against
the pro-U.S. dictatorship of Fulgencio Batista.—George Saunders
After enormous rumbling, the imperialist monster
barely squeaked at the Cuban revolution on May 20. President Bush made an
announcement that he hoped Cubans could soon enjoy “the same freedoms we do”
(like the USA Patriot Act?). But the antirevolutionary Cubans in Miami had been
hoping for more—perhaps for an announcement that, after Iraq, Cuba would be
next on the hit list of the world’s only superpower.
The unexpected caution displayed in Washington
on May 20 is an indication of the depth of the popularity and self-defense
organization of the revolution in Cuba, which—together with the standing of
Cuba on the world scene—continues to force U.S. administrations to keep the
option of invading Cuba on the back burner, and this limits some of their other
policies as well.
The low-key May 20 event also indicated
Washington’s continued reluctance to engage in military conflicts where its
forces are likely to meet massive resistance. The “shock and awe” that U.S.
military commanders voiced over the stiff initial opposition they met in
southern Iraq was an indication of their unpreparedness for any really intense
fighting on the ground.
In the last 20 years, Washington has launched
“victorious” wars against Grenada, Panama, Iraq, Yugoslavia, Afghanistan, and
Iraq again. None of the governments in those countries was capable of effective
resistance politically, militarily, or both. For the U.S. military machine to
attack the more important strategic targets in its current war drive against
the semicolonial world—Iran, North Korea, Cuba, and, quietly creeping up the
target list, Venezuela—would require taking on countries where the people and
military are more likely to fight back effectively, countries that can be
occupied but would be difficult or impossible to pacify.
If on May 20, for example, Washington had
escalated its attacks—say, by eliminating the right of Cubans in the U.S. to
send remittances to their families in Cuba, or by canceling the migration
agreements agreed to between the U.S. and Cuba after the Mariel boatlift crisis
of 1980—that would have almost certainly forced the Cuban government to permit
a mass migration. That could have provoked a situation leading to military confrontation.
But for Washington to take such measures without a plan for toppling the
revolution would have risked losing the Cuban American vote in 2004, a vote
that was crucial for Bush in the 2000 election.
The Havana government directly forced the present
crisis into the open—around the time of the U.S. invasion of Iraq in
mid-March—by cracking down on mercenary dissidents, who were being paid with
U.S. funds to organize into opposition groups politically directed by the head
of the U.S. Interests Section (a virtual embassy in Havana);
The Cuban government also executed three violent
hijackers who had threatened the lives of dozens of Cubans on a ferry boat.
Seven hijackings of Cuban planes or vessels over seven months had resulted in
the hijackers being released by U.S. authorities in Florida and the Cuban
property confiscated. Hijackers who could make it to Florida would be safe, and
they would be lionized by the anti-Castro “Miami Mafia.” In effect, the U.S.
government was encouraging hijackings in Cuba.
While the Cuban leaders initially had to face a
“firestorm” in world public opinion, heavily manipulated by the
corporate-controlled mass media, revolutionary Cuba has been slowly regaining
some of the lost ground. The Cuban leadership has provided patient explanation
of the U.S. provocations, their situation, and their actions, and they have
responded with countermobilization of world public opinion.
Among other things the Cuban leaders have made
their political position on the death penalty more widely known—they consider
it vindictive and barbaric. Cuba regards itself as part of the international
effort to bring an end to capital punishment. The Cuban government imposed a
three-year moratorium on the death penalty, which ended with the recent
executions. However, the siege conditions which Cuba has continually faced for
the past 43 years of U.S. economic blockade, terrorist attacks against Cuba,
and military and diplomatic pressure—siege conditions which are now intensifying—have
made it impossible to completely dispense with this admittedly barbaric
punishment at this time. Cuba still requires the death penalty today as one of
the ultimate measures of national self-defense.
If the Cubans had waited until a full-scale
migration crisis was forced on them before standing up to the mounting
provocations, the U.S. might have been able to take much stronger action in the
initial confusion and “emergency” atmosphere—since U.S. law proclaims that any
new wave of unauthorized immigration from Cuba (like the one from Mariel) would
be an “act of aggression” against the United States.
The Havana government explained the trials of
the mercenary dissidents in detail, showing the growing pattern of provocation
from Washington that was steadily rising—and still is. (See, for example, Fidel
Castro’s April 25 explanations on Cuban television and his May Day speech,
available from Cuban sources in rough English translations; these should be
available soon on the Labor Standard web site.)
The Cuban leaders have countered the campaign to
isolate Cuba as a supposed violator of human rights by making known the facts
and organizing a countercampaign in defense of Cuban independence and
sovereignty, an example being the appeal “To the Conscience of the World,”
which has now been signed by more than 3,500 people (including Eduardo Galeano,
who earlier criticized the trials of the bought-and-paid-for dissidents and the
execution of the three ferry hijackers). Also, actor Danny Glover, who is under
attack for signing the statement “To the Conscience of the World,” must be
defended.
(The text of the appeal “To the Conscience of
the World” appears immediately below. Supporters and friends of Labor
Standard are urged to add their names as endorsers.)
TO THE CONSCIENCE OF THE WORLD
The international order has been violated as a consequence of the invasion against Iraq. A single power is inflicting grave damage to the norms of understanding, debate, and mediation among countries. This power has invoked a series of unverified reasons in order to justify its invasion. Unilateral action has led to massive loss of civilian life and devastation of one of the cultural patrimonies of humanity.
We only possess our moral authority, with which we appeal to the conscience of the world in order to avoid a new violation of the principles which inform and guide the global community of nations. At this very moment, a strong campaign of destabilization against a Latin American nation has been unleashed. The harassment against Cuba could serve as a pretext for an invasion. Therefore, we call upon citizens and policy makers to uphold the universal principles of national sovereignty, of respect for territorial integrity and self-determination, essential to just and peaceful coexistence among nations.
[This document was initiated in April by a group of Mexican citizens. Among the more than 3,500 who have endorsed it are Danny Glover, Harry Belafonte, Michael Albert, and Eduardo Galeano, as well as four Nobel Prize winners: Rigoberta Menchu, Nadine Gordimer, Gabriel Garcia Marques, and Adolfo Perez Esquivel.]
The U.S. failed to prevent Cuba’s election to
the UN Human Rights Commission or to gain a vote condemning Cuba in the
Organization of American States. This confirms Cuba’s continued high standing
in the eyes of most of the world.
Strong support in the United States for an end
to the travel ban has not been decisively shaken, with even anti-Cuban forces
becoming more divided over this.
Confrontation Far From Over
The confrontation is not over, however, not by a
long shot. It seems unlikely to end, in fact, as long as both the Cuban
revolution and U.S. imperialism exist in the Americas.
The rightist, prowar Brothers to the Rescue, who
provoked the Helms-Burton bill by violating Cuban airspace with hostile
aircraft and obliging Cuba to defend control of its airspace, are promising
more air raids into Cuba. The Cuban response to such violations and threatening
activities could be used to generate more propaganda, more threats, and more
economic/military anti-Cuba moves.
In addition, the U.S. government is still
pursuing policies that, if not modified, will make an explosive new migration
crisis inevitable. In the two years of the Bush administration, fewer than
2,000 visas for Cubans to immigrate legally to the U.S. have been issued by
Washington. The current migration accords between the U.S. and Cuba require
that 20,000 be issued each year.
While the Cubans are policing their borders to
prevent illegal, and especially violent illegal departures, they will refuse as
a matter of principle—as they have done in the past—to turn the country into a
penitentiary. Those who want to emigrate legally, but are being illegally
denied the opportunity to do this by the U.S. government, will at some point no
longer be prevented from leaving the country.
The National Network on Cuba has called for
local activities across the country to educate people about Cuba, the Cuban
revolution, and the real issues in the clash with Washington.
The fact that Washington seems to have backed
down somewhat, for now, does not eliminate our duty to take its threats against
Cuba or any other country with the utmost seriousness. Washington is not
invincible—Cuba is showing that once again—but we must avoid any temptation to
replace the unfounded triumphalism of Washington and Wall Street
empire-builders with any triumphalism of our own.
No New Moves from Bush on Cuba’s National
Day
by Jim Lobe
Reflecting deep splits inside his administration
and the Cuban-American community over future policy toward Cuba, U.S. President
George W. Bush announced no new policy initiatives toward the Caribbean nation
on its national day Tuesday.
Instead, Bush met privately with a number of
dissidents [sic] and family members from the island in the White House and
released a short statement expressing his “hope...for the Cuban people to soon
enjoy the same freedoms and rights that we do.”
Officials said that senior officials, who were
still arguing about whether to take any new initiatives just hours before
Bush’s meeting with the “dissidents,” could not agree and that the most
dramatic step on which there was consensus—the expulsion from the United States
of 14 Cuban diplomats—had already been taken.
Political hardliners close to the more radical
[sic] sectors in the Cuban-American community in Florida and New Jersey had
reportedly argued for reducing or cutting off remittances that U.S.-based
Cubans can send to their relatives on the island and suspending charter flights
used by Cuban-Americans to fly directly to their homeland.
But others argued that such steps would not only
play into President Fidel Castro’s efforts to stoke anti-U.S. feeling on the
island, but also alienate much of their own community, including followers of
the increasingly moderate [sic] Cuban American National Foundation (CANF).
In addition, congressional sentiment in favor of
lifting the ban on travel by U.S. citizens to Cuba remains high, and, while the
White House has vowed to veto any legislation that would ease Washington’s
43-year-old trade embargo, Bush’s advisers concluded it would make little sense
to draw attention to the divide now.
The result appears to be an impasse at the
policy-making level at a particularly sensitive moment when bilateral ties have
plunged to their lowest level in at least a decade.
Much of that is due to what U.S. officials and
even non-governmental organizations (NGOs) traditionally more sympathetic to
Havana called a major crackdown by the Castro government against dissident
Cubans that began as the U.S. invasion of Iraq got underway in mid-March.
Some 75 dissidents were arrested and given
prison terms as long as 28 years for subversion, while hijackers of a ferry who
tried to flee to the United States were executed by firing squad after a
summary trial that rights groups denounced as unfair.
Many analysts here blamed Castro for seeking to
take advantage of Washington’s invasion to decapitate what they describe as a
growing pro-democracy movement [sic] energized by the so-called Varela Project,
a petition drive led to force elections in Cuba based on a specific provision
of its constitution. More than half of those arrested and imprisoned were
associated with the Project.
At the same time, some observers here said that
Bush contributed to growing concern in Havana about U.S. intentions beginning
last May 20, when he announced a series of measures to tighten the embargo in a
speech to a staunchly anti-Castro crowd in Miami.
It was also last spring that Undersecretary of
State for Arms Control and International Security John Bolton publicly accused
Havana of developing biological weapons in what was widely seen as an effort by
administration hard-liners to insert Cuba into the “axis of evil”—North Korea,
Iran, and Iraq. Similar accusations were repeated most recently last September.
Late last year, the head of Washington’s
Interest Section in Havana, James Cason, began a series of high-profile
meetings with Cuban dissidents [sic], attending meetings in their homes,
offering them the use of his residence for meetings, and publicly affirming his
support for them—all of which the Cuban government interpreted as direct
challenges.
In February, the Treasury Department proposed
new rules that would eliminate “people-to-people” educational travel to Cuba,
while senior U.S. officials began issuing warnings to Havana that any mass
exodus from the island would be considered a threat to U.S. national security.
At the same time, U.S. consular officials in Havana slowed the approval of
visas to Cubans who wanted to emigrate to the United States.
“It is hard not to read these actions by the
Bush administration as a deliberate attempt to increase tension between the two
countries,” said Geoff Thale, a Cuba specialist at the Washington Office on
Latin America (WOLA) here.
Washington then launched its invasion of Iraq
without securing the approval of the United Nations Security Council, an action
described by the U.S. ambassador to the Dominican Republic, Hans Hertell, as “a
very good example for Cuba.”
On top of all this came the decision last week
to expel the 14 diplomats from the Cuban missions here and at the United
Nations in New York City for “conduct incompatible with their diplomatic
duties,” normally a phrase used to refer to spying.
But the New York Times reported several
days later that the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), which is responsible
for all counter-intelligence activities carried out in the United States, had
not made any findings about espionage. It quoted one anonymous FBI official as
saying that the expulsions appeared to be a political decision, a comment
strenuously denied by the White House.
Most analysts believe the expulsions were
designed to ease pressure for stronger action by Cuban-American hard-liners
closely associated with Bush’s brother, Florida Governor Jeb Bush. They are
associated with a split-off from the CANF, the Cuban Liberty Council, and
include Representatives Lincoln Diaz-Balart and Ileana Ros-Lehtinen, two of
Castro’s most militant foes in Congress.
But the expulsions left them with virtually
nothing practical to offer hard-liners Tuesday, something which clearly
disappointed them. “It’s about time some action is taken,” Ninoska Pérez
Castellón of the Liberty Council, told the Miami Herald. “I don’t want
to hear any more ‘Viva Cuba Libre!’”
On Sunday, Ricardo Alarcón, president of the
Cuban National Assembly, charged that the U.S. administration was being urged
by various hardliners, including Jeb Bush, to invade Cuba. The governor
strongly denied ever making that recommendation Monday, but the flap might have
been another reason why the White House decided to play down the significance
of Tuesday’s national day.